After Maduro

The capture of Nicolás Maduro marks a dramatic break in U.S.-Venezuela relations. Yet the operation did not emerge from a vacuum. It follows two decades of U.S. policy that failed to produce structural political change in Venezuela. On Jan. 3, 2026, the United States Delta Force commanders conducted Operation Absolute Resolve, capturing the then-President of Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro, on charges of narcoterrorism. The raid marks a significant escalation of the already tense U.S.-Venezuela relations, marked by twenty years of attempted political influence through sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and economic pressure. Now, with the previous head of state, Delcy Rodríguez taking over as acting president, and President Donald Trump promising to “run the country,” a reassessment of why previous U.S. strategies failed and what realistic policy options remain is necessary.

The Evolution of the U.S.-Venezuela Relationship

The initial deterioration of a previously sound U.S.-Venezuela relationship began in the early 2000s, when then-President, Hugo Chávez, began raising royalties on foreign oil firms and capped their market share at 49%, insisting that the nationalized oil company, PDVSA, own a 51% share in the country's oil industry. Additionally, his governmental policy did not align with that of the United States and placed Venezuela closer to U.S. adversaries such as Russia and China. The breaking point came in 2002, when a brief coup against Chávez, which Venezuela accused the U.S. of supporting, established a foundation of mutual distrust that persists today. Later, under President Barack Obama and highly escalated under Trump, the United States imposed punitive sanctions on the country, cutting Venezuela off from U.S. financial markets, restricting visas, prohibiting debt purchases, and blocking oil exports. By 2019, oil production had collapsed from 3.5 million barrels per day in the 1990s to around 1 million, a decline partly attributable to governmental mismanagement but significantly worsened by sanctions. The Biden administration largely maintained these measures while pursuing limited engagement, including allowing Chevron to resume some operations. Yet, Maduro remained in power despite a fraught economic situation and degradation of the quality of life for the Venezuelan people, demonstrating the limitations of a sanctions approach.

Why Sanctions and Isolation Failed

The failure of U.S. pressure strategies can be attributed to a variety of factors. While sanctions created humanitarian costs, such as hyperinflation, food shortages, and collapsed healthcare systems, they did not interrupt Maduro's support among key constituencies. The military, security services, and ruling elite remained loyal, bound together by shared economic interests in illicit activities and fears of prosecution if regime change occurred. Additionally, sanctions inadvertently strengthened regime narratives. Maduro effectively blamed Venezuela's economic crisis on U.S. intervention, using anti-American sentiment to rally nationalist support and justify repression. The humanitarian suffering became a propaganda tool rather than facing internal opposition. In order to supplement lost trade with the United States, the regime found alternative partners, particularly China, which purchases a majority of the country's oil, despite U.S. sanctions.

The Uncertain Aftermath: An Unclear Future for Venezuela

Maduro's removal has created more questions than answers. The Trump administration's stated intention to "run" Venezuela appears to lack a coherent implementation strategy. Secretary of State Marco Rubio suggested using "economic leverage," but the broader goals remain unclear: Is this about democracy promotion? Counter-narcotics? Oil access? Countering Chinese influence? The opposition landscape complicates matters further. The Trump administration is currently working with acting president Delcy Rodríguez, a Maduro loyalist. Many of the same institutional frameworks that allowed the authoritarian Maduro regime to persist remain untouched under Rodríguez, indicating a lack of genuine reform. Without empowering new democratic institutions, Venezuela’s current political landscape may remain mostly intact. In terms of future policy, Washington faces limited options. Supporting a democratic transition, potentially by recognizing opposition candidate Edmundo González, would require sustained international coordination and a willingness to confront entrenched political systems. A more transactional approach, focused on migration control, counter-narcotics cooperation, and oil production, could yield short-term stability but risks aiding authoritarian structures. The central lesson of the past twenty years is clear: coercive pressure alone has not produced durable political change. Whether this moment becomes a turning point or another missed opportunity will depend on whether U.S. policymakers align objectives, tools, and expectations more realistically than in the past.