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Rare Earths, Pipelines, and Jets: Why Myanmar's Military Faces Limited Consequences

Great-power interests in Myanmar shields regime from punishment

By Max Sigal

In August, a Myanmar military jet struck a Buddhist monastery in Myanmar’s Sagaing region, killing 14 people and wounding 20 others, who were taking part in a weeklong meditation retreat. In December 2025, a Myanmar military strike targeted a hospital in Rakhine state, reportedly killing at least 31 people. These attacks are not isolated incidents — they are part of a broader pattern of violence by the Myanmar military against civilians and pro-democracy forces throughout the ongoing civil war. Recent developments have shown Myanmar’s President Min Aung Hlaing strengthening defense ties with Vietnam, discussing energy projects with Russian President Vladimir Putin, and receiving military and technological support from China. The geopolitical interests at play in the region could complicate efforts to hold Hlaing accountable.

On Feb. 1, 2021, Myanmar’s military overthrew a democratically elected civilian government and centralized power under the State Administration Council. Led by Hlaing, the military arrested elected civilian leaders and disbanded all prior legislatures and civilian-led government bodies, causing many elected officials to flee or go into hiding. The military-led coup followed growing support for the National League for Democracy (NLD), which ultimately won the nationwide election in 2020. Myanmar’s military alleged that the election results were fraudulent.

The military also targeted Rohingya civilians before the 2021 coup. In 2016 and 2017, the Myanmar military led clearance operations targeting the Rohingya community in response to attacks on police stations in the area. The Rohingya people are a Muslim minority in Myanmar, consisting of about 600,000 who remain in the country. These operations forced nearly 65,000 Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh, including men, women, and children. The attacks on police stations killed eight police officers. The “clearance operations” included tactics such as mass killing, torture, rape, detention, arson, and forced displacement. Myanmar’s military has confirmed that nearly 309,000 Rohingya people in Bangladesh are former residents of the Rakhine State.

According to the U.N.’s 2025 humanitarian response plan, 19.9 million people are estimated to be in need of humanitarian assistance to meet their basic needs, 15.2 million people are in need of food assistance and cases of preventable diseases are on the rise, and the number of displaced people is up to 3.5 million people internally. Furthermore, a U.S. State Department joint statement reports that Myanmar's military airstrikes are killing civilians, destroying schools, markets, places of worship, and medical facilities. Airstrikes increased nearly 25-fold since 2021, around an average of three airstrikes per day.

President Min Aung Hlaing may avoid accountability because of other countries’ strategic interests, starting with Vietnam. Vietnam is one of the most powerful countries in Southeast Asia and has shown interest in Myanmar. Vietnam is seeking to strengthen defense cooperation as well as economic and investment ties. This was reflected by Vietnamese leader, To Lam, hosting Hlaing on Sept. 5. Second, Myanmar is in the process of renegotiating its relationship with Putin’s Russia. On Aug. 17, Hlaing met with Russian President Vladimir Putin to strengthen their partnership. On the military side, Myanmar’s military uses Russian fighter jets in its strikes against pro-democracy forces. On the economic side, Myanmar’s military has destroyed towns and isolated land to secure an economic zone — the Dawei Special Economic Zone — to construct a “deep-sea port and power plant on the Andaman Sea.” This port would serve as an alternative to using the Malacca Strait in international trade. However, the country with potentially the most influential strategic goals in Myanmar is China.

First, China's border with Myanmar stretches more than 2,000 kilometers, which makes developments there a matter of direct strategic and economic concern for Beijing. Second, Myanmar accounts for 57% of China’s rare earth metal imports. Rare earth metals are used to produce smartphones, hard drives, electrical generators, cars, fighter jets, laser-guided missiles, and jam-resistant communications. Without Myanmar’s rare earth supply chain, China would likely struggle to maintain its dominant standing in global production. Third, Myanmar plays a key role in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI is a grand infrastructure initiative to connect Beijing to markets in Asia, Africa, and Europe. To China, Myanmar is an opening to the Bay of Bengal, which serves as a gateway to Africa, a key part of China’s BRI. In 2013 and 2017, China and Myanmar constructed a natural gas pipeline and an oil pipeline, respectively. For China, these pipelines are meant to reduce its dependence on Australia for natural gas and on the Middle East for oil. Myanmar's military government, meanwhile, receives military and financial support from China to fight pro-democracy forces and protect the pipelines.

Myanmar’s ties to China, Russia, and Vietnam show why outside pressure on its military government is unlikely to work — each partner benefits from Hlaing remaining in power. Beijing depends on Myanmar for 57% of its rare earth imports and for pipelines that reduce its reliance on the Middle East and Australia, so it backs Myanmar’s military financially. Moscow sells the fighter jets, and Hanoi receives regional influence and investment ties through negotiations with Hlaing. With all three powers having something at stake within the current government, it is unlikely to change due to any possible outside factors, and the Rohingya crisis suggests that this civil war may be no different.